The Book of Objections
The following is the first urging that we need The Book of Objections; it's from Mediated Fallacies q.v..
What kind of theory of fallacies do we really need ? Not every theory worth the name has precise definitions and classifications. Freud's theory has been widely dismissed on a variety of grounds, but not because it is not a theory – rather, because it's a bad theory, or an unscientific theory, or an unfalsifiable theory. It's good example of a theory even if it is not an example of a good theory. I think that the model that should be adopted is the catalog, dictionary or encyclopedia. Parallel to works like Dupriez's Dictionary of Literary Devices – a fat volume with 2000 alphabetically arranged entries from 'abbreviation' to 'zeugma' - we need The Book of Objections, which lists alphabetically all the large number of possible kinds of criticism which can be made of argumentative texts.
I might seem to be advocating more of the rubbish you find so commonly on the 'Net. “Mr X's list of the fallacies” - there are lots of them. Many horrifying examples can be found on university websites. But it's a mistake to assume that because many lists of fallacies are rubbish, that any listing of fallacies must be rubbish. I say it's not the listing, its the listers at fault. The reason existing lists of fallacies are so bad is that they are mostly uncritically copied from one another. The faults infecting fallacy lists currently on offer are :
an incoherent characeterisation of fallacy ; or
inconsistent application of the characterisation stated ; or
examples which don't exemplify, or which are ludicrously artificial ; or
calling non-fallacies fallacies, for example ad baculum ; or
collapsing the explanation of a fallacy into mere invalidity;
or several or all of these.
The Book of Objections will not have these faults, but wait, there is more : it is called The Book of Objections because it will include ad baculum, but not as a fallacy. Appealling to force is objectionable and it is perfectly reasonable to make an objection to such an appeal, just don't call it fallacy – call it resorting to threat instead of argument. There are many reasons to object to discursive moves. 'Fallacy!' is one charge which can be applied to discourse, which must be complemented by a choice of justification R predicating from the range of canonical fallacies such as begging the question, affirming the consequent, false dichotomy, etc. But it is not the only charge that might be made. Numerous people have objected to the writings of Hegel or of Lacan on the grounds of obfuscation – an excellent objection too – but few have tried to call obfuscation a fallacy. 'Obfuscation' is a perfectly good term of criticism in its own right.
So, though I am giving with one hand – there are lots of fallacies as yet unbaptised – I am taking with the other – not everything that has been traditionally called a fallacy should be. (Incidentally, currently I am rather undecided about appeal to tradition.)
The Book of Objections is not a mere list of fallacies ; it deploys a coherent set of critical categories among which fallacy has a secure but not bloated place. Its entries are nuanced descriptions of the various factors which work for or against the effectiveness of a particular trope, and as does Dupriez', its entries not only give real examples from pre-existing texts, they constantly compare and contrast different critical tropes via extensive cross-referencing. It includes an analytical index and an annotated bibliography in which all the errors in the other treatments are exposed and refuted.
Some old favourites will have big entries in The Book of Objections. Begging the question, false dichotomy, affirming the consequent – all these will be listed as fallacies. But others of the usual suspects, such as all the arguments ad and argument from analogy, will be listed as plausible arguments subject to characteristic kinds of weakness and flaw, or as objectionable moves, not as fallacies.
Always look on the bright side !
Many standard muddles will have to be cleared up for The Book of Objections. Thus, we will have to give a suitable name to the fallacy that Aristotle called composition or division – what I sometimes call the thin captains' biscuit - it's akin to amphiboly – and point out that most people use the term fallacy of composition for something completely different. It may be that we also need a new term for the kind of fallacy that composition can exhibit : such an argument [every ingredient in this stew is delicious, so this stew is delicious] rests on the false assumption that what is true of all the parts of something is always true of the whole. But really, the assumption that what is true of the parts of X is true of X is very often true. Similarly, there are true dichotomies. Again, I could perhaps accept that we can talk of a fallacy of false expert – but this does not license treating argument from authority as a part-time fallacy.
Once we accept that we are stuck with listing, and resolve to do it well we can see some supplementary advantages in the project of The Book of Objections. First, some use could be made of the various elaborate conflicting classifications of fallacy like Whateley's, by taking over their categories as descriptive terms for other objections, while dropping the procrustean hierarchy under the concept fallacy which he forced on them. Why not simply list 'digression' as a term of criticism (which it is) rather than 'fallacy of digression' ?
Secondly, using a model which is agreeable to rhetoric will foster the widely appreciated rapprochement of rhetoric and informal logic. Indeed I think perhaps the Library of Criticism, of which The Book of Objections is just one volume, will include works like Dupriez's and involve much cross-reference, even overlap.
And thirdly, keeping in mind the semiotic assumptions underlying mediated fallacies makes it much easier to accommodate the common use of 'fallacy' for attractive but false claims, because most or all fallacies can be seen to rest on them. Perhaps this can help dispel the apparently ambivalent status of false dichotomy caused by the hankering for explanation of fallacy to concern only the inference of an argument. Some people won't call it a fallacy for that reason. But that hankering is a symptom of the constant tendency for informal logic to collapse back into the formal mode. Going formal prescinds from questions about the truth of claims because no actual claims are discussed. This is not a very good reason for the common claim that truth is no business of logicians, unless you think logic simply is formal logic. Which it is not.